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A NYONE wishing to argue that the War Powers Resolution of
19731 is unconstitutional must be prepared to explain the pur-
pose of article I, section 8, clause 11, of the Constitution. That pro-
vision expressly grants to Congress the power "To declare War."' 2
If the President of the United States is free to fight a war whether
or not one has been declared, then this apparently unambiguous
constitutional provision is devoid of significance.
Opponents of the War Powers Resolution have traditionally
claimed that clause 11 confers upon Congress only a narrow piece
of war power.5 Defenders of the Resolution have argued in contrast
that the Resolution constitutes an exercise of congressional author-
ity under the clause. 4 This last contention pokes at the truth with-
out quite striking it. The War Powers Resolution is not constitu-
tional as an exercise of the war power. It is constitutional because
it defines the war power. The War Powers Resolution is nothing
more or less than a congressional definition of the word "war" in
*Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University. I am deeply indebted to Enola G. Aird,
Charles Black, and Martha Minow, whose comments on all or part of this article kept me
from going too far wrong; to Don Elliott, for discussing these ideas with me when they were
yet in quite a primitive stage of development and for encouraging me to put my thesis down
on paper; and to Dean Hashimoto and David Rubin for research assistance that was both
remarkable and invaluable.
1 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
I See, e.g., Emerson, The War Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent
Defense Power, 51 Notre Dame Law. 187, 209-13 (1975) (arguing Congress may declare "of-
fensive" wars); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 Tex. L. Rev.
833, 864-66 (1972) (some "undeclared wars" constitutionally legitimate).
' See, e.g., A. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power 56 (1976) (by impli-
cation); Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 Yale
L.J. 672, 699-702 (1972) (by implication). Some commentators have quickly conceded the
Resolution's constitutionality, but have doubted whether it will resolve the problem at
which it is aimed. See, e.g., L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 103 (1972)
(stating provision is "surely" within power of Congress, but President can "exploit its ambi-
guities and uncertainties").
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article I. A definition of this kind coupled with a reasonable en-
forcement mechanism is well within the power of Congress under a
proper understanding of the constitutional system of checks and
balances. The definition does not intrude on any presidential pre-
rogative. The mechanisms chosen by Congress to enforce the provi-
sions of the Resolution were reasonable in 1973 and, although mat-
ters have been complicated by the United States Supreme Court's
decision late last Term in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha,5 those mechanisms remain reasonable today.
I. THE WAR POWERS CONUNDRUM
A. The Resolution
The War Powers Resolution of 1973,6 forced on a weakened
President Nixon by a Congress brimming with confidence in the
wake of the Watergate scandals, was controversial from the begin-
ning. To its supporters, the Resolution represented a congressional
effort to exercise its constitutional prerogative to decide when to
send the nation to war.7 To opponents, the Resolution was an inex-
cusable usurpation by the legislative branch of the powers of the
executive.8 To cynics, it was Congress' way of pretending that the
Vietnam War had somehow been a fast one pulled by the executive
branch, rather than a disaster jointly managed by two Presidents
and five Congresses.9
Wary of arguments that the Resolution exceeded congressional
authority, the conference committee that drafted the Resolution in
5 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
6 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). President Nixon vetoed the bill incorpo-
rating the Resolution, but his veto was overridden. H.R.J. Res. 542, 87 Stat. 555, 560 (1973).
The War Powers Resolution has entered the arena of public debate under the name "War
Powers Act," but the legislative history reflects a conscious decision by the Congress to refer
to the measure as a "Resolution" rather than as an "Act." See Conf. Rep. No. 547, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2363, 2363.
See, e.g., L. Henkin, supra note 4, at 100-04; Berger, War-Making by the President, 121
U. Pa. L. Rev. 29 (1972). There are also those who believe that the War Powers Resolution
does not place on the President as many limits as it should. See, e.g., Friedman, Waging
War Against Checks and Balances-The Claim of an Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57
St. John's L. Rev. 213, 262-63 (1983).
" See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 3, at 201-15; Rostow, supra note 3, at 843.
" See, e.g., Hecht, Commander-in-Chief: Who "Makes" War?, 127 America, Aug. 19, 1972,
at 90, 93 (arguing Resolution merely enables "politicians to put themselves on record as
opposing [the Vietnam] war").
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its final form took care to limit its apparent scope.10 As adopted,
the Resolution states a straightforward goal:
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hos-
tilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the contin-
ued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
1
In short, the purpose of the Resolution, as stated by its drafters, is
to make certain that the President does not commit troops without
the consent of Congress.
12
To accomplish this end, section 3 of the Resolution requires that
the President "in every possible instance shall consult with Con-
gress" before sending American troops "into hostilities or into situ-
ations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indi-
cated by the circumstances."' Section 4 requires the President to
send a report within forty-eight hours when, absent a declaration
of war, he introduces American forces
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to
supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation. 14
This reporting requirement is critical because it triggers the limita-
tion that the last four Presidents have found most vexing. Within
sixty days after the report is actually submitted or is required to
be submitted, whichever comes first, section 5 of the Resolution
directs that "the President shall terminate any use of United
10 Thus, "the President's right to defend the Nation against attack" was expressly recog-
nized. H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2346, 2349. See also Conf. Rep. No. 547, supra note 6, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2364.
"z War Powers Resolution § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1976).
" See H.R. Rep. No. 287, supra note 10, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2349-50.
IS War Powers Resolution § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1976).
' Id. § 4(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1976).
19841
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States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was sub-
mitted (or required to be submitted)." Section 5 does not apply,
however, if Congress either declares war or enacts specific enabling
legislation, extends the sixty-day period, or, most chilling of all, "is
physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
United States." 15 Section 5 further provides that, whenever Ameri-
can forces "are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the
United States" in the absence of specific authorization, "such
forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs
by concurrent resolution."'16
No President has ever formally conceded the constitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution, although Presidents Ford and Carter
complied with its terms.17 Until recently, Congress had never for-
mally invoked the provisions giving it ultimate authority over the
deployment of American forces.' 8 The Resolution has again be-
come news, however, because of two decisions made by President
Reagan during 1983. The first was his decision to send Marines
and units of the Navy to participate in an international peacekeep-
Is Id. § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1976). The President may extend this period for an
additional 30 days if he "determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoida-
ble military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the con-
tinued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such
forces." Id. Whenever this article makes reference to a "sixty-day period," it should be un-
derstood that the President may unilaterally extend that period to 90 days.
16 Id. § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1976).
17 As required by § 4(a) of the Resolution, President Ford informed the Speaker of the
House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate within 48 hours of sending American
forces to free the S.S. Mayaguez after it was seized by Cambodia. See Letter to the Speaker
of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Reporting on United States
Actions in the Recovery of the SS Mayaguez, 1975 Pub. Papers 669. President Ford, how-
ever, declined to concede that he was required to send the report, stating that his letter was
sent "[iun accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this matter and
taking note of § 4(a)(1)" of the Resolution. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, President
Carter sent a letter within 48 hours of the attempt by American forces to rescue the hos-
tages held in Iran. See Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate Reporting on the Operation, 1980-81 Pub. Papers 777. President Carter stated
that his report was "consistent with" the requirements of § 4(a). Id. (emphasis added).
President Carter also refused to concede that the Resolution limited his inherent power to
act, although he stated that his authority as Commander-in-Chief was "expressly recognized
in § 8(d)(1)" of the Resolution. Id. at 779. President Ford's letter made no reference to the
Resolution's limitations on the President's freedom of action.
Is Of course, except for the matters mentioned previously, supra note 17, there has until
now been no claim that American forces were deployed abroad in a fashion that triggered
the requirements of the Resolution.
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ing force in Lebanon. The second was his decision to send Marines
and Army Rangers to invade and occupy19 the island of Grenada.
Almost from the time the American forces arrived in Lebanon,
congressional critics called on the President to comply with the re-
quirements of the Resolution and officially inform Congress that
the troops were involved either in hostilities or in a "situatio[n]
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances. ' 20 The White House response was to deny that
the terms of the Resolution were met by the situation in Lebanon
because any "hostilities" were not directed at the American
forces.21 Meanwhile, behind the scenes, Reagan Administration of-
ficials were insisting that the Resolution was not constitutional.22
When continuing attacks on United States positions in and around
Beirut caused casualities among Marines and forced American
troops to retaliate, the hollowness of the "no hostilities" position
was laid bare. The Administration then negotiated a compromise
with the Congress. The President would not formally concede the
constitutional validity of the War Powers Resolution, but if Con-
gress chose to adopt a joint resolution "permitting" the Marines to
remain in Lebanon for eighteen months, the President would sign
it.2 ' Although many members of Congress expressed dissatisfaction
"9 There has been much talk in the media about whether the Grenada mission should be
referred to as an invasion or as something else-a rescue or a liberation, perhaps. But those
are justifications for invasion; they do not render the landing of troops on foreign soil with-
out the consent of the foreign government any less an invasion. Thus, for example, the liber-
ation of Europe during World War II followed the invasion on D-Day. The invasion of
Normandy was certainly justified, but it was still an invasion.
20 See, e.g., Eagleton, Our Troops in Lebanon, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1982, at A35, col. 2
(Senator contending that commitment of forces in Lebanon triggered the War Powers Reso-
lution). These calls intensified after American soldiers died in the fighting. See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 30, 1983, at A8, col. 1 (quoting members of Congress).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at As, col. 3 (letter from the President to Con-
gress); id., Sept. 1, 1983, at Al, col. 5 (statement by Secretary of State Shultz).
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1983, at A16, col. 1 (stating Administration believes
Resolution "infringes on the President's flexibility as Commander in Chief"). See also Get-
ting into the Act, Time, Sept. 26, 1983, at 14 (summarizing public debate). More questions
about the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution were raised in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983). See Destler, Life After the Veto, Foreign Pol'y, Fall 1983, at 181, 183; N.Y. Times,
June 29, 1983, at A19, col. 1. The effect of Chadha on the constitutional validity of the War
Powers Resolution is discussed infra text accompanying notes 124-41.
13 See Smith, Peace Keeping Gets Tough, Time, Sept. 19, 1983, at 32, 34; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1983, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1983, at Al, col. 5. The early sticking point
in compromise negotiations was the Reagan Administration's preference for a resolution
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with the compromise, the joint resolution was adopted and signed
by the President in the autumn of 1983.24
The compromise did nothing to lay to rest the argument over
the Resolution's constitutionality, however. In fact, congressional
sentiment to force an end to the mission of the Marines in Leba-
non has renewed in the wake of the October bombing of the
Marine barracks in Beirut that killed over 240 American service-
men.25 As this is being written, there is some prospect that Con-
gress might try to exercise its authority under section 5(c) to order
the President to withdraw all American troops from Lebanon.
26
Even if Congress should fail to act before the compromise expires,
the legislators seem unlikely to extend the mission any further.
Moreover, when the eighteen months have expired, if the Marines
are still fighting and the executive branch wants them to stay, the
constitutional issue will have to be faced.
The invasion of Grenada initially seemed likely to precipitate a
clash between the President and Congress.2 7 As broad public sup-
port for the President's decision to send troops to the island be-
came apparent, however, congressional calls for formal invocation
of the War Powers Resolution faded.28 After the disaster in Beirut,
many Americans were anxious to see their nation's armed forces in
a successful combat role, and many saw the invasion as morally
correct to eliminate a perceived threat to stability in the region. In
addition, the White House made good on its promise to bring all
that would avoid any mention of the War Powers Resolution. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1983, at
A14, col. 6.
24 For the text of the compromise resolution, see Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu-
tion, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 1983 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (97 Stat.) 805.
25 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A16, col. 1 (congressional leaders ponder cut-off of
funds); id., Dec. 30, 1983, at Al, col. 6 (congressional leaders consider War Powers Resolu-
tion action).
26 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1984, at A10, col. 1 (growing congressional demands for
action).
217 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A18, col. 1. Within a week of the invasion, both
houses of Congress adopted essentially identical measures invoking the War Powers Resolu-
tion. See id., Nov. 2, 1983, at Al, col. 6. But the Senate attached its resolution to a bill
raising the debt ceiling, and before the two houses could reach agreement, the efforts to
invoke the War Powers Resolution were essentially abandoned.
28 Some members of Congress remained dissatisfied, however, and seven of them intro-
duced a resolution calling for President Reagan's impeachment. See H.R. Res. 370, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H9706 (1983); N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, at A13, col. 1.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the resolution of impeachment has sunk without a trace.
[Vol. 70:101
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but a handful of American forces home from Grenada by the end
of the sixty-day period in which the Resolution requires that they
return.29 Nevertheless, some American forces remain on Grenada
in an ostensibly civil role, and it is not easy to see why their con-
tinued presence is not a violation of the letter of the War Powers
Resolution.30 In an election year, moreover, some candidates are
bound to see the continuing commitment of American forces to
Grenada as an exploitable issue. If American troops remain on the
island, then one way or another, the Grenada invasion, too, may
ultimately raise the issue whether the War Powers Resolution is
constitutional.
Even should a confrontation be avoided over President Reagan's
use of American forces in Lebanon or on Grenada, a constitutional
showdown seems inevitable in the not-too-distant future. The use
of American military force in the Middle East, in the Caribbean,
and in Central Americas' suggests that in the mid-1980's the
United States has entered the world that the drafters of the War
Powers Resolution feared in 1973. The world for which the Resolu-
tion was written is a world in which the United States is willing to
use its armed might as an instrument of policy, even at the risk of
protracted conflict. Yet when the nation takes that risk, it does so
because military action is the chosen instrument of a President
and his advisers, not of Congress. No matter what the final out-
come of current disputes between the President and the Congress
over the commitment of troops, in a world in which Presidents feel
free to use force on their own initiative, the constitutional issue
will come up again and again until it is finally resolved. 2
", See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
3o This should not be taken as an assertion that any provision of the Resolution is neces-
sarily enforceable by a court. See infra note 72.
11 The death of an American helicopter pilot in Honduras, a death that even the Penta-
gon conceded was the result of "hostile fire," see N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 3,
suggests that even the combat forces taking part in the Defense Department's Big Pine II
maneuvers might be involved in a "situatio[n] where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances," War Powers Resolution § 4(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. §
1543(a)(1) (1976), which would trigger the reporting and withdrawal requirements.
32 It might be argued that the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution presents a
nonjusticiable political question. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-05 (1979) (plu-
rality opinion) (suggesting that disputes between the President and the Congress over the
conduct of foreign policy are nonjusticiable). It hardly seems likely, however, that a Su-
preme Court willing to decide Chadha would shrink from considering the Resolution's con-
stitutionality merely because it implicates the foreign affairs power. But see infra text ac-
19841
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B. Constitutionality: The Traditional Arguments
The question whether the War Powers Resolution is constitu-
tional has been debated since the Act was first passed over Nixon's
veto. In his original veto message, President Nixon asserted that he
had no choice but to reject the Resolution because it was "clearly
unconstitutional. '33 Some members of the committee that drafted
it said the same,'34 and no President has ever conceded its constitu-
tionality. In recent months, journalists have taken up the debate.
3 5
And academic commentators have naturally sallied forth to do bat-
tle for both sides.
This last battle is in many respects the most important one be-
cause the work of these commentators provides the ammunition
that the main combatants fire at one another. Among constitu-
tional scholars, the struggle over the Resolution's constitutionality
has been waged mainly on the hazardous battleground of "the orig-
inal understanding." Both sides assert that the intentions and
practices of the Framers of the Constitution support their argu-
ments. Thus, the defenders of the Resolution contend that it "re-
stores" the original balance of war powers between the President
and the Congress. 6 The opponents respond that it is precisely this
companying notes 66-67. Even if the issue were litigated and the Court did refuse to get
involved, that would not render constitutional argument trivial, although legal niceties
would in that event surely be thrust away from center stage.
33 See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1973 Pub. Papers 893 ("I believe that both
these provisions [§§ 5(b) & 5(c)] are unconstitutional"-one of several objections under the
heading "Clearly Unconstitutional."). President Nixon argued that the Framers left the rel-
ative war powers of the President and the Congress murky, and that matters are best left
that way. Id.
34 See H.R. Rep. No. 287, supra note 10, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2359 (supplemental views of Reps. Mailliard, Broomfield, Mathias, Guyer, and Vander
Jagt) ("We. . .doubt that the Congress can constitutionally terminate the President's au-
thority by a failure to act"); id. at 2360 (minority views of Reps. Frelinghuysen, Derwinski,
Thompson, and Burke) (Resolution's "most important provisions are probably
unconstitutional").
35 Compare Lewis, Flouting the Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1983, at A19, col. 1 (Resolu-
tion constitutional) with Will, War Powers Act and Common Sense Act, L.A. Times, Sept.
15, 1983, pt. 2, at 7, col. 1 (Resolution unconstitutional).
36 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 30 ("In truth, the Constitution withheld from the
President the powers claimed for him by Professor Rostow.") (emphasis in original);
Eagleton, The August 15 Compromise and the War Powers of Congress, 18 St. Louis U.L.J.
1, 8-9 (1973) (stating Resolution would fulfill congressional obligation to define President's
powers). Cf. Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 131, 146 (1971) (Congress ought to "reassert its own general authority in matters of
war and peace and redefine the President's.").
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balance that the Resolution has upset.3 7
As with any other battle over what the Framers planned or ex-
pected, this one threatens to exhaust the ammunition on both
sides long before a conclusion is reached. For example, supporters
and opponents of the Resolution both note that the Articles of
Confederation and the original draft of the Constitution from the
Committee on Detail granted Congress broad discretion in the con-
duct of war,38 but in the course of the Convention, this was
changed to the power "To declare War."39 To those who doubt the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, this decision is
critical. J. Terry Emerson, defending an independent presidential
warmaking power, has argued that the alteration
is persuasive evidence that the framers intended the legislative
branch to have less authority over military matters than it pos-
sessed under the Articles.
... [T]he framers must have understood that there had been
17 For a particularly colorful statement of this hypothesis, see Rostow, supra note 3, at
843 (War Powers Resolution "repudiates that history root and branch, and seeks to substi-
tute parliamentary government for the tripartite constitution we have so painfully forged.").
" The Articles of Confederation stated: "The United States in Congress assembled shall
have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war. . . ." Arti-
cles of Confederation art. IX, § 1. The Committee-on-Detail draft granted Congress the
power "To make war." 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 182 (M. Far-
rand rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Records]. For general background on the practice
under the Articles of Confederation, see A. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 15-25.
*1 See 2 Records, supra note 38, at 318-19. The precise nature of the debate surrounding
this change has been dissected by any number of scholars, and it is not my purpose to
repeat it here. As recorded in Madison's notes, the debate at the Convention occupies only
two pages, and the other historical materials are fragmentary. Nevertheless, scholars have
had a field day working out the "original understanding" on the war power. See, e.g., A.
Sofaer, supra note 4, at 31-35, 51-52, 56; Berger, supra note 7, at 39-47; Bestor, Separation
of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original Intent of the Constitution Histori-
cally Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 527, 602-13 (1974); Reveley, Constitutional Allocation
of the War Powers Between the President and Congress: 1787-1788, 15 Va. J. Int'l L. 73, 96-
113 (1974); Rostow, supra note 3, at 843-51. My point is not that there is anything wrong
with delving so deeply into the intentions of the Framers, although it is possible to carry a
good thing too far. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980) (strict intentionalism not a tenable approach to consti-
tutional decisionmaking). But when so many scholars probe so deeply and develop such
disparate results, perhaps that is a signal that efforts should be directed toward other ap-
proaches. Fortunately, the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution can be deter-
mined without important reference to the views of those who wrote or ratified the 1787
Constitution.
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and would continue to be many instances in which hostilities
would occur without declaration. 0
He concluded that the only power granted to Congress was the
power to declare an "offensive war."' 1 In other words, by removing
from Congress the power to conduct a war, the Framers sought to
grant the President substantial discretion over use of the armed
forces.
Abraham Sofaer, in his book-length investigation into the consti-
tutional distribution of the war powers, reaches quite a different
conclusion on much the same evidence. 2 According to Sofaer,
those who wrote the Constitution planned to limit the President's
inherent authority as Commander in Chief to "manag[ing] military
engagements and other objectives authorized by Congress.' 4 He
points to various discussions during the debates over the Constitu-
tion and in the Federalist to support his position. 44 Sofaer con-
cludes that, by altering the text of the Constitution to give Con-
gress only the power to declare war, the Framers intended "to
enable the President to respond to 'sudden attacks' without a dec-
laration of war," adding that "nothing in the change signifies an
intent to allow the President a general authority to 'make' a war in
the absence of a declaration.' 45 In other words, by changing the
constitutional text, the Framers transferred to the President only a
small portion of the power to make war, a power previously exer-
cised entirely by Congress.
The debate goes deeper than this, however. Eugene V. Rostow,
one of the most articulate critics of the War Powers Resolution,
argued before the Resolution was adopted that "the President's
authority goes far beyond that to repel sudden attacks." '46 Histori-
cal practice, Rostow insisted, "offers no sharp and formal lines.'
47
For Rostow, a proper understanding of the history indicated that
40 Emerson, supra note 3, at 209, 212.
41 Id. at 211-13.
42 See A. Sofaer, supra note 4. A particularly provocative reaction to the Sofaer book, by
an author who would plainly have preferred a different construction of the history, is Ber-
ger, War, Foreign Affairs, and Executive Secrecy, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 309 (1977).
1" A. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 3. Sofaer concludes that the best reading makes the Presi-
dent as Commander in Chief an "agent of the legislature." Id.
44 See id. at 38-60.
45 Id. at 31-32.
4" Rostow, supra note 3, at 865.
47 Id. at 866.
[Vol. 70:101
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the warmaking power was to be shared: Congress, through its
power over the purse and power to raise armies, possessed ade-
quate authority to prevent any combat it disapproved, but that did
not alter the inherent power of the President to commit troops
without first seeking approval.48
Alexander Bickel, also writing before the Resolution was law, ar-
gued that congressional authority was broader than Rostow sug-
gested, that Congress could, if it chose to do so, "prescribe the mis-
sion of our troops in the field in accordance with a foreign and war
policy of the United States which it is for Congress to set. '49 The
President's broad powers to act in time of war, Bickel explained,
alleviated the need to develop a national consensus on every tacti-
cal issue that might arise, but that, he said, had nothing to do with
the ultimate power to control American forces.5 0 Bickel conceded
that historical practice had permitted Presidents to commit Ameri-
can forces in the absence of congressional permission, and he did
not deny the power of the President to order troops to fight when
Congress has not expressed its disapproval. But that expression of
disapproval could come at any time; historical practice had not
stripped the Congress of that authority. He argued that although
the meaning of the Constitution might change over time, it never
loses its "essential shape"--and that essential shape vests Con-
gress, not the President, with ultimate authority over the use of
American forces.
51
This discussion of the prevailing arguments on both sides of the
war powers debate simply provides a prologue to the main act,
which will shortly be presented. The traditional battle has been
fought over the content of this original understanding and over
whether congressional limitation on the President's ability to com-
mit troops restores that understanding or does it violence. The up-
shot of the previous discussion, however, is that evidence concern-
ing the original understanding-if one indeed chooses to put any
faith in that means of constitutional adjudication-does not come
down firmly on one side or the other. Fortunately, that does not
mean the result of the battle must be inconclusive. It is possible to
48 Id. at 864-66.
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place to one side the squabbles over the Framers' intention or the
historical practice of the nation and determine the constitutional-
ity of the Resolution through analysis of its place in the system of
checks and balances. A proper understanding of that system leads
ineluctably to the conclusion that, although the President might
have broad authority to commit American forces in the absence of
congressional action, Congress nevertheless holds the power to de-
cide when the President's actions slide down the scale from use of
troops in time of peace to use of troops in time of war. The War
Powers Resolution is no more than a means to accomplish this le-
gitimate end and, as a consequence, any constitutional challenge to
its major provisions should fail.
II. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE SYSTEM OF CHECKS
AND BALANCES
A. The System
It is a serious though frequent error in constitutional argument
to treat questions about the relative powers of two branches of the
federal government as though the branches interact in a vacuum,
devoid of any powers but the one at issue, and uninfluenced by the
presence of the third branch of government. All too often, courts as
well as commentators attack these questions by looking only to the
language of the constitutional clause thought to be most relevant
and that clause's history, and stopping then and there, announcing
that the answer has been found.5 2 Although the language of the
Constitution is obviously the most important element in any analy-
sis, and the history of the drafting and ratification process may
also have a role to play,53 to look no further is a serious mistake.
The Constitution does not merely set forth a list of the checks
and balances that each branch may use to rein in the other two; it
creates a system of checks and balances within which all three
branches interact." Whenever one branch of the government ac-
2 For a more detailed critique of this approach, see Brest, supra note 39, at 205-24.
" But not so great a role that it takes on more importance than the test. See Laycock,
Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 Tex. L.
Rev. 343, 351-52 (1981).
"This approach is of course inspired by the work of Charles Black. See C. Black, Struc-
ture and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969); Black, The Working Balance of the
American Political Departments, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 13 (1974).
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cuses another of intruding on the prerogatives of the first, the
proper inquiry is how the challenged action fits into that system.5
It is not sufficient to say, "There is no evidence that the Framers
intended for Congress to do X, and therefore the President wins."
A proper rejection would be of this type: "Should Congress be per-
mitted to do X, the delicate balance of power among the three
branches of government will be upset." That may seem little more
than a subtle shift in emphasis, and it is all of that; but even
though subtle, the shift is of critical importance in analyzing ques-
tions arising under the system of checks and balances. In the first
case, the inquiry is only into the cold language and history, and the
relationship between two branches of government; in the second,
the inquiry focuses on the federal government as a whole.
A good example is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Nixon
v. Fitzgerald.6 There a slender majority of the Justices ruled that
a former President of the United States may not be held liable for
civil damages for abusing the powers of his office. To some extent,
the Court attacked the question according to the first model, ex-
amining only the role and powers of the President. 57 This, how-
ever, was a fruitless approach. As I have argued in more detail else-
where, the ruling makes sense only when the President is
considered in relation to each of the other branches of govern-
ment.5 8 Then one discovers that the plaintiff was really asking the
courts-the judicial branch-to imply a right to sue for damages
for presidential misconduct. The plaintiff in Fitzgerald could not
win unless the courts were willing to create a new remedy-one
not contemplated in the system of checks and balances-for stem-
ming abuses in another branch. The explanation for presidential
"immunity" is thus not that "the Framers said so" or "the Consti-
tution says so." Rather, the explanation is that by creating a new
remedy the courts would have upset a system fully adequate in
itself to deal with executive malefaction.5 9
66 For a more detailed elucidation of this point, see Carter, The Political Aspects of Judi-
cial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1983).
58 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
67 See id. at 748-57.
58 See Carter, supra note 55.
51 Id. See also Black, supra note 54, at 15 ("The powers of Congress are adequate to the
control of every national interest of any importance, including all those with which the Pres-
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Another good example of the operation of the system of checks
and balances is provided by the Supreme Court's decision late last
Term in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.60 In
Chadha, the Justices ruled unconstitutional the legislative veto, at
least to the extent that it gave Congress a voice in policymaking
without its having to exercise legislative powers. There again, the
Court's opinion mostly took the easy way out, concluding that, no
matter how one reads article I and its history, the legislative veto is
not authorized. 1 A better approach would have been to assess the
legislative veto as a part of the system of checks and balances. An
approach of that kind would have yielded the same result, but the
analysis would have been somewhat different.6 2 The main differ-
ence would have been the acknowledgment as an essential part of
the decision that Congress is adequately equipped to control the
executive branch's deployment of its powers without resort to this
extraordinary device. s Mere convenience is not an argument for
constitutional validity-at least it is not a good argument-and
there is no doctrine permitting subversion of the Constitution in
the guise of saving it.
6 4
The system of checks and balances should be viewed as dynamic,
as constantly in flux. What matters most is that the balance of
power among the three branches remain sufficient to check and
punish any abuses by any one of them; the precise disposition of
authority is subject to change. But the changes do not alter the
balance; as Bickel pointed out, the Constitution does not lose its
essential shape.6 5 The changes simply reflect exercises of the pow-
ers the document grants each branch, although those exercises are
now performed in a world quite different from the one in which
the powers were first divided. Thus, the apparent rise of judicial
activism does not represent a change in the type of power that the
ident might, by piling inference on inference, be thought to be entrusted.").
60 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
61 Id. at 2781-88.
62 See Carter, supra note 55.
6 This would not have been quite dispositive. One question is whether Congress is other-
wise adequately equipped; another is whether the Constitution elsewhere grants Congress
this authority. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78, 128-39.
" See Carter, supra note 55. See also Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2780-81 (1983) ("[T]he
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions
of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.").
5 Bickel, supra note 36, at 140-41.
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courts are exercising; it represents a change in the nature of the
cases that the courts must decide in the modern world. What mat-
ters in this and other cases is only that the branches use their
traditional powers, albeit in new ways. The balance of power is up-
set when the branches presume to use new ones, as the Congress
did with the legislative veto.
Once one accepts the image of the system of checks and balances
as dynamic rather than static, a question arises as to just how fluid
the system can possibly be. It is easy to say that "everything is
political," but that might imply that no attempts by one branch to
control or frustrate another are unconstitutional, and that all that
really matters is the degree of political power that one branch can
muster as "authority" for action. In this view, disputes between
the President and the Congress would all be political questions.
Such an approach is not without its supporters.6 Indeed, Jesse
Choper has devoted much of his recent book to an argument that,
at least with respect to those clashes, political power is all that
really matters.6
7
But there is no need to go so far. Even in a fluid system, the
Constitution should be read to place real limits on what each
branch can do to control the others. For the purposes of this essay,
the most important limitation is the one just mentioned: when one
branch seeks to rein in another, the first must be applying a power
actually granted to it by the Constitution. When the first branch
acts instead by creating an additional "fresh" check on the second,
then the first is claiming a right to decide when the time has come
to upset the balance in pursuit of some higher goal. This claim
ignores the fact that the constitutional balance of power among the
three branches is delicately crafted, and thus the use of fresh
" Something of the flavor of this argument is captured by Justice Rehnquist in his plu-
rality opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). There the Court dismissed an
action by members of Congress seeking to set aside President Carter's unilateral abrogation
of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The members of Congress claimed that because
treaties can only be made with the advice and consent of the Senate, that advice and con-
sent is also necessary for their termination. But four Justices responded that the dispute
"must surely be controlled by political standards" because it was "a dispute between coe-
qual branches of our government, each of which has resources available to protect and assert
its interests, resources not available to private litigants outside the judicial forum." Id. at
1003-04 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
67 See J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 263, 315-79 (1980)
(developing the "Separation Proposal").
1984]
HeinOnline -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  115 1984
Virginia Law Review
checks, in the service of whatever cause, can only destroy that bal-
ance in the long run. The use of those fresh checks must be forbid-
den by the system of checks and balances, which permits only
those checks that do not work to frustrate the system itself.6 8
B. The Resolution in the System
An analysis of the place of the War Powers Resolution in the
system of checks and balances must confront two questions: First,
does the Resolution represent a prohibited "fresh check" on the
executive branch? Second, is the Resolution so intrusive into the
affairs of the executive branch that it upsets the delicate balance
of powers among the three branches?
1. Congressional Authority
New or fresh checks by one branch on the actions of another are
prohibited when the first is seeking to control the second through
exercise of some power not granted to it by the Constitution. Thus,
if the War Powers Resolution is constitutional, it must be traced to
some grant of authority in the Constitution.
Supporters of the Resolution usually trace it to the express grant
to Congress in article I, section 8, of the power "To declare War."6
The power to declare war, they assert, includes the power to con-
trol all missions of American troops abroad, except when there ex-
ists a need to repel a "sudden attack" against the United States.
70
This assertion always leads into a discussion of the original under-
standing and the historical practice-a dispute in which, as I sug-
gested earlier, no one is likely to prevail. That the evidence seems
to cut both ways ought to signal to proponents of this broad con-
gressional authority that they are fighting the wrong battle. They
are not wrong in using the power to declare war to support the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution; they are wrong
only in the way in which they use it.
The War Powers Resolution is constitutional because its terms
constitute a congressional definition of the word "war" as it is
" Were this not true, the slippery slope and policing problems would be insurmountable.
See also Carter, supra note 55.
:9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
70 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 41-45; Eagleton, supra note 36, at 6; Lofgren, supra
note 4, at 679. See also supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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used in article I. By enacting the Resolution, Congress was saying
to the President: "This is your sphere and this is our sphere. When
you leave your sphere and enter ours, you must come to us for
permission."
The importance of this definition is most apparent when mea-
sured against the judicial refusal to become involved in defining
either the word "war" or the limits of the congressional war
power.7 1 This judicial hesitation is perfectly sensible: it is difficult
to imagine what standards a court could develop for saying that
one conflict is a "war" in the article I sense, while another is
merely a "repulsion of a threat" that the President can undertake
on his own.7 2 That a court is unable or unwilling to develop stan-
dards, however, does not mean that Congress cannot do so. After
all, it is to Congress that the power to declare war is granted. Un-
less Congress is also capable of deciding when the thing in which
the President has involved the nation deserves the appellation
"war," it is difficult to see what good that power can possibly be. It
is plain that the congressional power to declare war was meant as
one of several checks on the President's authority over the use of
American military forces.73 If the President can avoid the force of
that check merely by declining to seek a declaration of war, then it
is a check of no real force.
Naturally, as opponents of the Resolution frequently point out,
the Constitution contains a number of other congressional powers
71 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S.
934, denying cert. to 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
72 Even if a court were willing to grapple with questions of this kind, it is not clear as a
practical matter either where the court would look for standards or how it would enforce its
judgment. See Ehrlich, The Legal Process in Foreign Affairs: Military Intervention-A
Testing Case, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 637, 646-47 (1975). But see Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S.
at 891-900 (Douglas, J., dissenting from order denying leave to file complaint) (arguing that
controversy over whether Vietnam conflict is a war presents justiciable question); Firmage,
The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. Colo. L. Rev. 65, 98-99 (1977)
(arguing that War Powers Resolution itself provides judicially manageable standards for
determining whether the President is exceeding his power).
73 See The Federalist No. 69, at 446 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). For background
discussions of the views of the Framers on the need for a shared warmaking power, see, e.g.,
Berger, supra note 7, at 34-47 (arguing that President's share of the power was intended to
be a small one); Friedman, supra note 7, at 218-23 (contending that President could use
troops on his own initiative only to repel attacks); Lofgren, supra note 4, at 678-88 (conclud-
ing that broad statements by Framers about use of troops were with reference to power of
national government in general, not of President in particular; presidential power was
narrow).
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that could conceivably be used to restrain a President intent on
fighting when Congress wanted him to stop.74 These include most
prominently the congressional power over the military budget and
the congressional authority to raise armies. 75 Those checks have an
undeniable force of their own. But that hardly matters, because
the Constitution includes the power to declare war as well. Ordina-
rily, the existence of other means, clearly indicated in the Consti-
tution, by which Congress can accomplish its ends ought to be suf-
ficient to strike down a fresh check that Congress develops.76 But
that rule should not apply when the apparent fresh check is itself
based on an explicit grant of authority. To say that Congress must
resort to its other powers to protect its power to declare war is to
say that the power to declare war is itself a nullity, conferring on
the Congress no real authority of any kind. Opponents of the Reso-
lution sometimes seem to be making something very close to this
argument,77 but it seems an unhealthy precedent to construe out of
existence any provision of the Constitution.78
2. Intrusiveness
Even if it is conceded that Congress indeed possesses some au-
thority to define the substantive content of its war powers, that
concession does not by itself suggest where the limits on that defi-
nitional authority may lie. The major limitation, however, ought to
be obvious: in this area as in others, the Congress may not promul-
gate a rule that intrudes too deeply into the affairs of the executive
branch.
To determine whether the War Powers Resolution does intrude
'4 See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 3, at 850.
75 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16. But see Emerson, supra note 3, at 213 ("If the Consti-
tution does give the President authority to protect American rights and interests abroad,
Congress cannot by a" mere appropriation rider redefie the allotment of powers made by
the framers.").
76 This is the principle that best explains the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha, 103 S.
Ct. 2764 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
7 I refer here to the distinction opponents sometimes draw between "offensive" wars and
wars of other kinds. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's opinion
in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), also has some of this flavor, although to be
sure, it is not a very strong precedent for this point. See infra text accompanying notes 84-
88.
78 Cf. J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 38-41 (1980) (similar argument on behalf of ninth
amendment).
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too deeply, it is first necessary to identify the legitimate executive
prerogative that the Congress might have infringed. Opponents of
the War Powers Resolution make a serious argument on intrusive-
ness regarding only one executive prerogative. That is the Presi-
dent's power as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, '79 which is said to encompass a "traditional" or
"historical" authority to deploy troops outside the United States in
defense of some version of the nation's vital interests."0
It is not easy to say that authority of this kind does not exist;
but it is also not easy to say that it does exist. Certainly the lan-
guage of the Commander-in-Chief clause sheds little light. The
clause states only that the President "shall be" the Commander in
Chief. It is perhaps most remarkable for what it does not say: it
does not say when, it does not say where, it does not say how. The
clause does not, in short, yield a single clue on whether the power
it grants is subject to congressional control or direction.81 The his-
torical evidence on "the original understanding" concerning the
Commander-in-Chief clause can safely be described as ambiguous,
in the sense that it is unlikely to convince anyone who has not yet
taken sides.8 2 In short, if support is to be found for the argument
that the War Powers Resolution intrudes on a traditional presiden-
tial power to deploy troops in the face of legislative opposition,
that support must flow from some source other than the language
or history of the Constitution itself.
70 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
80 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 3, at 195-209; Rostow, supra note 3, at 851-70.
" Raoul Berger has pointed out that in 1783 the Continental Congress ordered General
Washington to undertake certain actions. Berger, supra note 7, at 37. This argument is ap-
parently intended to imply that the President as Commander in Chief is subject to congres-
sional direction in the same fashion as any other general. There are at least two problems
with this particular "facial construction" of the Commander-in-Chief clause. First, however
small the slice of war power is that the Framers intended to transfer to the President
through the clause, there is little question but that they intended to insulate day-to-day
conduct of authorized military operations from legislative direction. See, e.g., 1 Records,
supra note 38, at 292 (Hamilton); E. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957,
at 228 (4th ed. 1957). Second, it is not clear whether Congress can in fact issue direct orders
to a military commander. Cf. A. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 147-64 (discussing historical evi-
dence on day-to-day congressional control).
sI Compare Emerson, supra note 3, at 201-09 (stating history makes plain that broad dis-
cretion in use of armed forces was intended) with Berger, supra note 7, at 36-39 (stating
history makes plain that President was to be no more than the highest general). See gener-
ally supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
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Certainly the judicial precedents are thin. Although any number
of decided cases make some reference to the Commander-in-Chief
clause, it does not appear that the Supreme Court has ever been
asked to decide what authority that clause grants the President to
act when Congress seeks to make the President's actions illegal.83
For example, opponents of the War Powers Resolution often make
reference to the Prize Cases,"4 in which a narrowly divided Su-
preme Court sustained Union seizures of ships trading with the
Confederacy. The seizures resulted from the blockade of the south-
ern states ordered by President Lincoln. The question was whether
the President had authority to order the blockade in the absence
of a congressional declaration of war. In an equivocal opinion, the
majority ruled that the President had inherent authority as Com-
mander in Chief to quell armed insurrection s" or, if he lacked that
power, that Congress had ratified the blockade order by subse-
quent legislation. 6
The strongest argument that can be based on the Prize Cases
would hold only that the President enjoys some degree of inherent
authority to defend the United States against "sudden at-
tack"-but supporters of the War Powers Resolution willingly con-
cede this much.87 Moreover, because the Court's opinion is so
equivocal, it may stand for a good deal less than this: if congres-
sional ratification explains the result, then the decision in the
"' The Court has been quite explicit in its avoidance of this issue. For example, when the
Court in the celebrated case of Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), sustained a presidential
proclamation that German saboteurs caught in the United States be tried in military rather
than civilian courts, the Court explained: "It is unnecessary for present purposes to deter-
mine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to cre-
ate military commissions without the support of congressional legislation. For here Congress
has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions." Id. at 29.
In a later case dealing with the power of the President to constitute military tribunals be-
yond those authorized by Congress, the Justices sustained his actions "[iun the absence of
attempts by Congress to limit the President's power." Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348
(1952). In an earlier case, the Court upheld the President's restriction of commercial inter-
course with the "enemy" because it was done pursuant to congressional delegation to the
Commander in Chief. Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 92 (1874). See also Santiago
v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265 (1909) (Commander in Chief may administer conquered terri-
tory until Congress acts to end military government); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603,
614-15 (1850) (similar rule).
84 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
Id. at 666-70.
Id. at 670-71.
, See supra note 70 (citing sources).
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Prize Cases says no more than that presidential troop commit-
ments are permitted if Congress subsequently gives consent."
Similarly, Martin v. Mott,8 1 although sometimes cited to support
the notion of a broad presidential war power, is actually quite to
the contrary. In Mott, the Justices sustained the delegation by
Congress to the President of the authority to call forth the militia
to repel invasion. In the course of his opinion for the Court, Justice
Story wrote:
If it be a limited power, the question arises, by whom is the exi-
gency to be judged of and decided? ... We are all of the opinion,
that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, be-
longs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclu-
sive upon all other persons.90
But the Mott language, like that of the Prize Cases, stands for a
good deal less than the proposition for which it is usually cited. In
Mott, the only power whose locus of decision the Court had to find
was "a limited power, confined to cases of actual invasion, or of
imminent danger of invasion,"91 a power that most supporters of
the War Powers Resolution concede to the President. The power
was not, moreover, inherent in the executive branch; on the con-
trary, it was a power "confided by Congress to the President.
'92
Thus, the rule of Martin v. Mott must be something like this:
When Congress delegates to the President the authority to call the
militia into service to repel invasion, only the President can judge
when an invasion is occurring or about to occur. Nothing in the
War Powers Resolution vitiates this rule.
Opponents of the War Powers Resolution do not rest their argu-
ments only on decided cases. They also refer to consistent histori-
cal practice.93 Certainly their evidence is strong. It cannot be de-
88 The President's authority to repel sudden attacks might be explained this way too: "No
doubt the consent of Congress to war in the event of invasion or attack could be assumed."
L. Henkin, supra note 4, at 305 n.38.
89 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
90 Id. at 29-30.
9, Id. at 29.
92 Id. Moreover, the Court explained, the President's judgment was final only because
"[t]he law does not provide for any appeal." Id. at 31. That statement hardly supports the
conclusion that Martin v. Mott broadly construed the President's inherent authority as
Commander in Chief.
" See supra note 80 (citing sources).
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nied that Presidents have long assumed the authority to commit
American forces on their own initiative and that Congress has
rarely done anything to interfere.9 4 But that need not be viewed as
stating a rule; it may only be a statement of a problem. For unless
this power has always rested with the executive branch under the
constitutional scheme, all that has permitted Presidents to act in
this fashion has been the acquiescence of Congress."" Such congres-
sional acquiescence might make the President's unencumbered ac-
tion presumptively valid, but it says nothing about the power of
Congress to revoke its permission.
The Steel Seizure Case9 and the Iranian Assets Case17 are in-
structive on this point. Both cases involved claims of "inherent"
presidential authority to act. In Steel Seizure, President Truman
claimed the right to seize the nation's steel mills, relying in part on
the Commander-in-Chief clause. The Court rejected the Presi-
dent's claim, but Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion,
suggested that "a systematic, unbroken executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned
...may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the
President" by article 11.98 The Court majority adopted the Frank-
furter test to uphold challenged presidential authority in the Ira-
nian Assets Case,9 9 a case involving President Carter's revocation
of licenses authorizing judicial proceedings against Iran. But the
Iranian Assets Case involved a situation in which congressional ac-
quiescence was continuing.100 In Steel Seizure, the circumstance
was quite different, and Justice Frankfurter concluded that
through its passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress had
effectively withdrawn whatever acquiescence might have supported
the President's actions.10 1
" That is not the same as saying, however, that members of Congress have raised no
objection to the President's actions. For an interesting compendium of congressional objec-
tions, see Allman, The Doctrine That Never Was, Harper's, Jan. 1984, at 14.
95 I choose the word "acquiescence" advisedly, to avoid two other possible descriptions:
"consent," which might imply an affirmative action by the Congress, and "failure to act,"
which might imply the rejection of a proposal for action.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
" Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
" 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" 453 U.S. at 678-88.
100 Id. at 687-88.
101 343 U.S. at 603.
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The proposition that Congress can withdraw its acquiescence is
hardly a novel one. It represents what I take to be the thrust of
Alexander Bickel's critique of the argument for implied executive
war authority.1 02 On more than one occasion, the Justices have sus-
tained over direct constitutional assault congressional efforts to
limit the ability of the President to continue to do what he previ-
ously had "always done." For example, until the 1930's, it was al-
ways assumed that the President had the power to fire any em-
ployee of the executive branch.10 3 But in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,104 the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could re-
strict that authority through the device of granting some of what
might otherwise have been considered executive authority to indi-
viduals "other than executive officers."105 Similarly, until the
Watergate scandals erupted, Presidents had traditionally been en-
titled to make the final decisions on disposition of their personal
papers and effects when they left office. Yet in Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services,0 6 the Court ruled that Congress pos-
sessed the authority to alter that tradition.10 7 Even under the
Commander-in-Chief clause, the Court has in the past followed
similar reasoning. Thus, although the Court has held that the Pres-
ident, acting as Commander in Chief, may establish military tribu-
nals and provide for the governance of occupied territory,108 the
Justices have been at pains to note that the President may do so
only until Congress legislates a contrary intention. 09
102 See generally Bickel, supra note 36. Cf. Black, supra note 54, at 20 ("The one funda-
mental error is that of supposing that the modern expansion of presidential power is based
on the Constitution by itself, and is hence inaccessible as a matter of law to congressional
correction.")
103 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), discussed infra note 111.
' 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
105 Id. at 631. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958) (elaborating on this
theme).
100 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
107 Id. at 441-55.
108 See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260
(1909); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
109 For example, in Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909), the Court had this to say of
the military government on Puerto Rico, authorized by the President:
The President might have dissolved it by withdrawing the army and navy officers
who administered it, but he did not do so. Congress could have put an end to it, but
that was not done. The right inference from the inaction of both is, that it was meant
to be continued until it had been legislatively changed.
Id. at 265 (quoting Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 193 (1853)) (emphasis added).
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All these cases stand quite plainly for the proposition that the
President can exercise a purportedly inherent power if Congress
has historically acquiesced and if Congress does not try to stop
him. If Congress does try to stop him, then by definition it is no
longer acquiescing. In a fluid and dynamic system of checks and
balances, this is the only conclusion that makes sense. It is surely
not the case that all that is, is constitutional, so absent some con-
stitutional equivalent of adverse possession, what Congress has
given, Congress can also take back.110
Even if one believes that the President possesses certain "inher-
ent" powers, the Supreme Court has almost never struck down a
congressional enactment for intruding into the sphere of one of
those powers, except when the presidential power in question is
granted explicitly and unambiguously in the Constitution."' In
Cf. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 236 (1901) (Commander in Chief's temporary
power to govern ends when Congress acts).
110 Thus, in the Iranian Assets Case, even as the Court sustained the President's exercise
of the power to suspend claims pending against the Iranian government, the Justices
warned: "Past practice does not, by itself, create power . . . ." 453 U.S. at 686 (emphasis
added). The President's action was sustained not because he was inherently empowered to
take it, but rather because "Congress may be considered to have consented to the Presi-
dent's action." Id.
One advocate of strong inherent presidential war authority has argued that in fact the
powers do shift because "constitutional policy for ensuing epochs is not congealed in the
mold of 1787 referants [sic]." Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power-Legislative, Ex-
ecutive, and Judicial Roles, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 461, 467 (1971). This has led one critic to
respond sharply: "[I]t is a marvelous non-sequitur that. . . the servants of the people may
informally amend the Constitution without consulting them." Berger, supra note 7, at 56.
Berger added: "[T]here is no room for a take-over by the President of powers that were
defined to him [in the 1787 Constitution] and, as our own times demonstrate, denied with
good reason." Id. at 57. Ratner and Berger may both be a bit right and a bit wrong. Al-
though historical practice may not change the meaning of the Constitution, but see Munzer
& Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1029
(1977), it will certainly change the year-to-year working balance of powers. Obviously, some
of these changes will be acceptable, and others will not, depending on where one draws the
line-and that is what the whole fight over the War Powers Resolution is about. The thesis
presented in this essay is that because only the working balance, and not the Constitution
itself, has been changed, Congress may change the balance again by reacquiring what it has
lost.
"I The case coming closest to an exception is Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
In Myers, the Court held unconstitutional a congressional statute protecting certain post-
masters from arbitrary presidential removal. The decision was based on the "reasonable
implication" that the President possessed the power to choose those who would execute the
laws. Id. at 161-64. But as the decisions in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), make clear, Myers is so nar-
rowly limited that it can be circumvented by a proper congressional definition of the nature
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Buckley v. Valeo,112 to take just one example, the Justices ruled
that Congress was trying to do something-appoint officers of the
United States-that the Constitution by its terms empowered only
the President to do." 3 Decision on that point was not difficult be-
cause the President's authority to appoint all officers of the United
States appears plainly on the face of the document." 4 Whatever
might be said about the Commander-in-Chief clause, it certainly
grants no power in terms as clear and unambiguous terms as those
of the appointment clause.
The "inherent" powers to which opponents of the War Powers
Resolution make reference are really of another kind altogether;
they are powers thought to be "inherent" because the President
has historically exercised them. But they are powers the President
has historically exercised in the absence of any congressional objec-
tion. In that sense, whether the powers are denominated "inher-
ent" or something else is surely a non sequitur. As the decided
cases make clear, mere historical acquiescence by Congress in the
President's exercise of a particular power does not by itself prove
that Congress lacks the authority to limit the exercise of that
power when it gathers the wisdom and courage to do so. Justice
Jackson's Steel Seizure concurrence carried the warning that "only
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fin-
gers,' 15 and that warning presupposes what is argued here: that
Congress, if it so chooses, can regain power lost to the executive
branch through its own inaction. If the Congress does not act when
conditions demand action, then the President will exercise power
because power must be exercised. But the fact that the President
exercises a power when Congress does not, does not render that
power one that is "inherent" in the executive. At best, the power is
"inherent" in the government of the United States. Thus, the ar-
gument that Presidents have "always" controlled troops without
congressional interference proves no more than perhaps its own
premise: that Presidents have always done this. In particular, that
and duties of the official in question.
"1 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
"' Id. at 126 (stating "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States"' and must be appointed pursuant
to the provisions of article II).
", See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
115 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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historical conclusion makes no statement at all about congressional
authority to alter that long-standing state of affairs.116
Naturally, the mere fact that Congress is in some cases entitled
to take back or limit the exercise of powers previously thought to
rest in the executive branch does not mean that Congress can al-
ways do so. However, the conclusion that Congress lacks the power
must be based on something other than the assertion that the
President has "always" done what Congress now seeks to forbid.
Yet, that argument, which can be posed against virtually any con-
gressional enactment restricting the freedom of the President, is
the only one seriously pressed by the opponents of the War Powers
Resolution.
3. Reasonableness
If claims of intrusiveness raise no bar to congressional definition
of its own war power, then the only remaining substantive limit
would seem to be the one the Court mentions intermittently in its
separation of powers jurisprudence: the definition must be "rea-
sonable."'11 Quite probably, when the Court suggests that restric-
tions on the freedom of the executive branch must be reasonable,
it is imposing on Congress only the usual minimum rationality test
said to be embodied in the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 18 As a rule, a test of this nature has no bite when applied to
116 Failure to see this distinction accounts for occasional citation to the line of cases be-
ginning with United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), as authority for the
proposition that a power can be "transferred" to or "vested" in the executive branch
through congressional acquiescence in its exercise. In Midwest Oil, the Court sustained the
power of the President, in the absence of express congressional permission, to withdraw
public lands from private use. After noting that Presidents had consistently withdrawn
lands for more than 80 years, the Justices added: "[T]he long-continued practice, known to
and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the withdrawals had been
made in pursuance of its consent or of a recognized administrative power of the Executive
.... " Id. at 474. But Midwest Oil had nothing to do with the situation in which Congress
seeks to interpose an objection after years of apparent acquiescence. Because Congress made
no effort to register an objection, the Midwest Oil case too stands simply for the proposition
that the President may act when the Congress does not seek to stop him.
117 The fact that the Court will decree that congressional regulations must be reasonable
does not mean that it will decide whether they are in fact reasonable. Compare Dillon v.
Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (holding Congress may fix "reasonable time" for ratification of
proposed constitutional amendment) with Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457-60 (1939)
(Black, J., concurring) (question whether time is in fact reasonable is nonjusticiable political
question).
118 See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). This equal
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federal legislation.11 ' It makes sense, however, to assume at least
for the sake of argument that the test has some small amount of
bite when applied to legislation said to violate the separation of
powers principle.
Without attempting a formal definition of this "heightened" re-
quirement of reasonableness-an attempt that would be beyond
the scope of this small article-I will observe that at the very least,
the shoe should be on the other foot. That is, it should be incum-
bent upon the opponents of the Resolution to explain why its defi-
nitional provisions are unreasonable. Once the conflict is viewed
that way, it should be evident that, unless one begins with the pre-
mise that Congress is without power to act in this area, the restric-
tions it has placed on the commitment of American forces in the
absence of congressional permission are reasonable. The Resolu-
tion, with its requirement of congressional permission, comes into
effect only when American troops are involved in hostilities, when
they are sent into foreign nations while equipped for combat, and
when the size of a foreign-based contingent of combat-ready Amer-
ican troops is increased substantially. Moreover, unless Congress
acts affirmatively to interpose an objection, the President may
keep the troops in action for sixty to ninety days before he is re-
quired to withdraw them.
Reasonable people might disagree on whether each of these con-
ditions, if continued for ninety days, represents an exercise of the
war power of the United States, but the claim that each of them
does represent an exercise of that power hardly seems an unrea-
sonable one to assert. And, of course, if the President wants to
keep troops committed for a longer period of time, he can seek
congressional permission. If three months are not adequate time
for the troops to complete their mission or for the President to
justify their deployment, then it hardly seems unreasonable for
Congress to say that they must come home. Unless the President
possesses inherent authority to commit troops to combat for more
than ninety days in the face of congressional disapproval, the judg-
protection component, the Court has explained, possesses essentially the same substantive
content as the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. See Boiing v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
I" For a sample of just how little bite such a test contains, see United States R.R. Retire-
ment Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). Indeed, the test contains so little bite that it is
almost beneath the dignity of a serious scholar to discuss it.
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ment on reasonableness is an easy one to make. Because the Presi-
dent does not possess inherent authority of this kind, the War
Powers Resolution must be considered a proper exercise by the
Congress of constitutionally granted authority.
If the restrictions contained in the War Powers Resolution are
neither intrusive nor unreasonable, then an interesting question
arises. Suppose a foreign power invaded the territory of the United
States, and the President, relying on his inherent "sudden attack"
authority, used force to repel that invasion. Could the Congress
require him to stop, even if that would mean letting the invaders
triumph? It is tempting and easy to say, "No, that would clearly be
unreasonable," and perhaps it would be. But the result is not so
clear. Congress would be remarkably foolish, even unpatriotic,120 to
take this step, and it probably would never happen.12 But if the
question is one of congressional authority, the Constitution might
permit a definition as broad as this one. In a nation governed by a
constitution, it is impossible to arrange matters so that the good
guys always win.
1 22
That understanding perhaps provides an epitaph for the argu-
ment that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional. In the
system of checks and balances, as in other areas of constitutional
theory, the line between policy that is unwise and policy that is
unconstitutional is often difficult to draw. Nevertheless, the guid-
ing principle here as elsewhere ought to be that policy is not un-
constitutional merely because it is unwise. 2 3
120 The speech and debate clause, however, would probably protect the members from
prosecution for treason. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
121 Dean Ely is of the view that constitutional theorists may legitimately decline to adapt
their theories to hypotheticals that could never happen. See J. Ely, supra note 78, at 183.
Most theories, however, are weakest by far at the margin, and often there is no other point
of comparison.
12 Nevertheless, most of us indulge a very human urge to try. For a provocative critique,
one with which I do not necessarily agree, see Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981).
"2 This line may have been blurred a bit in Professor Rostow's early comment on the
War Powers Resolution: "Its passage would be a constitutional disaster, depriving the gov-
ernment of the powers it needs most to safeguard the nation in a dangerous and unstable
world." Rostow, supra note 3, at 836. Rostow's second clause might be correct, although
practice has not demonstrated it. But even if true, it represents at best an argument only
that the Resolution is unwise. That the Resolution might be a practical or political disaster
does not render it a constitutional disaster.
128 [Vol. 70:101
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C. The Resolution and Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha
Even if Congress possesses authority under the Constitution to
limit or control the deployment of American forces in combat situ-
ations, it may do so only through means that the Constitution per-
mits. Thus, before concluding discussion on the constitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution, it is necessary to determine whether
its enforcement mechanism has been rendered unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha.124 In Chadha, the Justices ruled uncon-
stitutional a congressional effort to retain control of delegated
power through the device of a legislative veto.125 Subsequent sum-
mary affirmances have made clear that Chadha was meant to
enunciate a broad rule and is not limited to its particular facts.126
The War Powers Resolution contains two provisions that might
be construed as legislative vetoes. One is the requirement in sec-
tion 5(b) that the President withdraw American troops if he does
not within sixty days receive congressional permission for their de-
ployment. The other is the requirement in section 5(c) that the
President withdraw the troops at any time if commanded to do so
by a joint resolution of the Congress.
On first reading, section 5(c) would seem to be a classic legisla-
tive veto. If constitutional, that section would permit Congress to
adopt a resolution requiring the President to do something without
giving the President the opportunity to exercise his own veto
power under the presentment clause. 27 That appears to be pre-
cisely what the rule of Chadha forbids, and it is not easy to see
how section 5(c) can survive.
There is more to section 5(c) than meets the eye, however, and
103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
"' The statute at issue in Chadha permitted either house of Congress, by resolution, to
invalidate the decision of the Attorney General to permit a deportable alien to stay in the
United States. See id. at 2770-72.
126 See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983) (affirming judgment on or denying certiorari to eight requests for relief from
rulings striking down legislative vetoes).
127 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (presentment clause). For the Court's explanation of
why legislating without complying with this clause is impermissible, see Chadha, 103 S. Ct.
at 2780-83 (stating all enactments of positive law must be presented to the President for
signature).
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an argument is available that might save it. To understand this
argument, it is necessary to go back nearly two centuries to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hollingsworth v. Virginia.125 In Hol-
lingsworth, the Court rejected a contention that the eleventh
amendment was invalid because, after being proposed to Congress
in a joint resolution, it was never presented to the President for his
signature. In a terse footnote, Justice Chase explained,."There can,
surely, be no necessity to answer this argument. The negative of
the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He
has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amend-
ments to the Constitution. 1 29 Hollingsworth is not an easy deci-
sion to justify, flying as it does in the face of the presentment
clause's requirement that "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to
which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives may be necessary ...shall be presented to the President"
for approval or disapproval. 30 But the rule of Hollingsworth-that
the President plays no formal role in the proposition of constitu-
tional amendments-has become firmly entrenched in our juris-
prudence and was even restated by the majority in Chadha.3'
Thus, even after Chadha, there appear to be two categories of leg-
islation: "ordinary" legislation, which requires presentment to the
President, and what might be called "extraordinary" legislation,
which does not. Obviously, the problem for those who want to re-
tain Section 5(c) is to show how the joint resolution that provision
permits fits into the second category.
The argument from Hollingsworth would run something like
this: A joint resolution commanding the President to bring troops
home is not a part of the general article I legislative power, but an
exercise instead of an extraordinary legislative power-the specific
article I power to vote on whether to go to war. Because the War
Powers Resolution defines a state of war-that thing into which
the United States cannot enter without congressional permis-
128 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
129 Id. at 381 n.*.
11o U.S. Const. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Charles Black for reminding
me of the flat inconsistency between the decision in Hollingsworth and the language of the
presentment clause. For the purposes of the argument set forth in this section, I assume
only arguendo that the case was decided correctly; I would not want to be forced to defend
Justice Chase's reasoning were the issue one of first impression.
"I See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786 n.20.
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sion-the joint resolution permitted by section 5(c) is simply the
Congress' way of indicating whether it wishes to extend its permis-
sion. This argument turns in part on whether one believes that the
President has the right to veto a declaration of war-a point on
which no court has ever ruled and on which scholars have di-
vided. 13 2 If the President lacks the power to veto a decision to go to
war, then the congressional role in exercising its war power is ar-
guably much like its role in exercising its power to propose amend-
ments to the Constitution.
That argument is admittedly a shaky one, for it is a simple mat-
ter to find distinctions between the power to propose consiitu-
tional amendments and the power to control the President's use of
troops. 13 3 One distinction is that the amendment power is found in
article V, not in article I. That is not a helpful distinction, how-
ever, because it is plainly wrong to suggest that only article I legis-
lation requires presentment. The federal courts, for example, are
organized pursuant to congressional authority under article III, not
article I, but no one would suggest that as a result presentment is
not required. A second, stronger distinction is that the war power,
whatever its contours, is just one of a number of legislative powers
set forth in article I, section 8, and that all the other powers on the
list appear clearly subject to presentment. Pure formalism and
close attention to constitutional structure would suggest that that
argument refutes the claim that the war power is an extraordinary
one, but, in fact, the refutation is not so clear. The system of
checks and balances might require a sharing of the war power in a
132 See L. Henkin, supra note 4, at 32-33, 295 n.5 (citing sources). For a rather complex
theory on which war measures the President can veto, see Ratner, supra note 110, at 489:
The President may veto a congressional declaration of hostilities or a later congres-
sional termination of declared hostilities but not a congressional veto of hostilities
independently authorized by him. Adjudication is required to resolve the constitu-
tional impasse created when a president vetoes a congressional resolution that cor-
rects his interpretation of a hostilities declaration.
131 One of those distinctions is not that, although the President plays no formal role in
the constitutional amendment process, he does ordinarily play a role in the declaration of
war because he generally requests Congress to act. This in fact is one reason that the ques-
tion whether the President's consent is required has never been raised in practice. See L.
Henkin, supra note 4, at 295 n.5. But this does not by itself render the declaration of war an
exercise of an "ordinary" legislative power. After all, a President may also request Congress
to vote on a constitutional amendment, but that does not mean the presentment clause
applies. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798), discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 128-29.
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way that it does not require sharing of other powers.134 More to the
point, as Hollingsworth makes clear, formalism alone does not tell
which powers are ordinary and which are extraordinary. Just what
the test should be is not at all clear; but for just that reason, it is
not easy to predict whether a court would accept the argument
that the war power is special.3 5 The third and most powerful dis-
tinction is that when Congress proposes constitutional amend-
ments, it is merely setting in motion a process that might ulti-
mately lead to new law, but when it invokes the joint resolution
permitted by section 5(c), it is instantly creating new law.3 6 There
is no good answer to this,13 7 other than to suggest that it does, in a
sense, beg the question. Perhaps the joint resolution creates new
law; but it may also be an exercise of extraordinary legislative au-
thority, not creating new law but confining the President to the
requisites of the old. The strongest justification for the Chadha
result is, after all, that the legislative veto constitutes a fresh check
on presidential action. 3 8 But because the War Powers Resolution
is not itself forbidden as a fresh check (because of the "special-
ness" of the shared warmaking authority),' 39 the enforcement
mechanism created by section 5(c) might also not be a fresh check,
and for much the same reason.
" As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted (in dictum)
in striking down a legislative veto, "[T]he foreign affairs veto presents unique problems
since in that context there is the additional question whether Congress or the President or
both have the inherent power to act." Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d
425, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers
Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
'31 This approach to analysis is inspired by Holmes' oft-quoted dictum, "The prophecies
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 173 (1920).
136 The majority in Chadha stated that the veto there in issue "was essentially legislative
in purpose and effect" because it "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials
and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch." 103 S. Ct. at 2784. The Justices could not,
however, have meant to make a complete statement of a constitutional test. After all, the
Senate's action in granting or refusing consent to a judicial nomination also has "the pur-
pose and effect of altering the legal rights . . . of persons ... outside the legislative
branch." The distinction is that the power to advise and consent is granted elsewhere in the
Constitution. But that cannot be the only distinction. See supra text accompanying note
133. It is still necessary to find a source, apart from placement in the document and effect
on legal rights, for determining when Congress is exercising an "ordinary" legislative power.
"' Most of what might be considered "good answers" were quite properly rejected in
Chadha. But see supra note 136.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 69-123.
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Again, these arguments may not be terribly convincing, and a
judicial decision that section 5(c) is unconstitutional would do lit-
tle violence to the system of checks and balances. The same cannot
be said for section 5(b), however. That section's requirement that
the President must remove American forces from combat unless he
receives congressional permission within sixty days is surely consti-
tutional, even after Chadha.140 Section 5(b) is not a legislative
veto. The limitation contained therein is the functional equivalent
of a statute reading, "The President may not commit troops to
combat for longer than sixty days unless this statute is amended,"
because the adoption of a joint resolution and the signing by the
President causes the enactment of new positive law. A statute
reading, "The President may not commit troops to combat for
longer than sixty days unless this statute is amended," is the func-
tional equivalent of a statute reading, "The President may not
commit troops to combat for longer than sixty days"-period. This
is so because the last clause ("unless this statute is amended") is
an implied provision of every statute. This follows from the doc-
trine that one Congress may not bind a later one into leaving sac-
rosanct the statutes enacted by the first.
All of this reduces to the following proposition: section 5(b) is
the functional equivalent of a statute simply stating, "The Presi-
dent may not commit troops to combat for longer than sixty days."
If the President wants to commit American forces for a longer pe-
riod, he may seek the joint resolution provided for in the War
Powers Resolution, or he may request separate enabling legisla-
tion-for the Congress that passed the War Powers Resolution
cannot bind future Congresses either. Furthermore, the statute
reading, "The President may not commit troops to combat for
longer than sixty days," is certainly within the power of Congress
under the analysis presented in this article. M As a consequence, no
matter what the constitutional status of section 5(c), section 5(b) is
a constitutionally permissible strategy for enforcing the congres-
sional definition of the war power.
14O See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786 n.19 (dictum) (suggesting that "durational limits on
authorizations . . . lie well within Congress' constitutional power").
"I See supra text accompanying notes 69-78. Even if one assumes that the President's
"sudden attack" authority, see supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 70, would survive this
statute, there is no reason to think that any other presidential authority to use troops
might.
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III. CONCLUSION
That the War Powers Resolution is constitutional will not end
all the controversy over its requirements. There will still be those
who will attack its provisions as unwise and perhaps demand its
repeal; Presidents and members of Congress may continue to quar-
rel over what state of affairs constitutes the "hostilities" to which
section 4 refers; and Congress might act foolishly under the Reso-
lution, either ending wars that it ought to permit or permitting
wars that it ought to stop. But all of that means only that the Res-
olution still has a considerable distance to grow. It represents one
perhaps clumsy effort at dealing with a world that has become in-
creasingly complex. For better or for worse, the United States pos-
sesses one of the two most powerful military machines the earth
has ever known. That awesome power carries with it the awesome
responsibility to use those forces wisely. The genius of the Resolu-
tion, with all of its faults, is this: It guarantees that unless the Con-
gress of the United States gives its approval, all of that awesome
power will not be concentrated in the hands of a single individual.
For that guaranty, a degree of inefficiency and a handful of unwise
decisions along the way seem a small price to pay.
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